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Abstract 
Although the literature has focused on individual differences in authenticity, recent findings 
suggest that authenticity is sensitive to context; that is, it is also a state. We extended this 
perspective by examining whether incidental affect influences authenticity. In three 
experiments,  participants felt more authentic when in a relatively positive than negative 
mood. The causal role of affect in authenticity was consistent across a diverse set of mood 
inductions, including explicit (Experiments 1 and 3) and implicit (Experiment 2) methods. 
The link between incidental affect and state authenticity was not moderated by ability to 
down-regulate negative affect (Experiments 1 and 3) nor was it explained by negative mood 
increasing private self-consciousness or decreasing access to the self system (Experiment 3). 
The results indicate that mood is used as  information to assess one’s sense of authenticity.  
 
Keywords: authenticity, self, mood, personality systems interaction theory, affect infusion 
model, mood as information.  
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I Feel Good, Therefore I Am Real: 
Testing the Causal Influence of Mood on State Authenticity 
 Authenticity—the sense or belief that one is ‘real’ or ‘true’—is a central construct in 
the field of positive psychology (Gable & Haidt, 2005; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), 
as it is thought to confer a variety of psychological benefits (Rogers, 1961; Wood, Linley, 
Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008). Indeed, authentic individuals possess greater self-esteem 
and positive affect, lesser negative affect (Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Ito & Kodama, 2007; 
Stephan, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2012), and higher subjective well-being and lower stress 
(Wood et al., 2008). Clearly, authenticity is associated with a positive affect profile (Lenton, 
Bruder, Slabu, & Sedikides, 2012).  
The vast majority of published work views authenticity from a trait perspective. That is, 
authenticity is typically conceptualized as a stable individual difference, such that some 
persons are consistently more authentic than others (Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Ito & 
Kodama, 2005; Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Wood et al., 2008). Supporting this view, 
variability in dispositional authenticity is in part predicted by variability in the Big Five 
(especially extraversion, agreeableness, and [inversely] neuroticism; Wood et al., 2008). As a 
consequence of the dispositional perspective’s dominance in the literature, the relation 
between affect and authenticity has been investigated from a correlational perspective only, 
with these correlations typically interpreted so that affect is viewed as an outcome of, rather 
than as input to, authenticity.  
The aim of the present research was to test directly the converse proposition: that 
affect can be an input to authenticity. In particular, across three experiments, we investigated 
the influence of incidental affect or mood
1
 on the sense of authenticity. Incidental (vs. 
integral) affect is generated independently of—and typically prior to—the key judgment or 
decision (e.g., a sunny day increasing helping behavior relative to a rainy day; Bodenhausen, 
1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Can incidental affect influence when people have the 
                                                 
1
 As we are primarily concerned with the valence dimension (negative vs. positive), we use the terms affect and 
mood interchangeably. 
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subjective experience of being their real self? If so, why? The answers to these questions have 
implications for the field’s understanding of authenticity’s meaning and attainment. 
Affect and the Self 
Researchers have not, of course, ignored the role of incidental affect in the self in 
general. For example, variability in mood influences self-focused attention: Negative states 
such as sadness increase self-focused attention, whereas positive states such as happiness 
decrease it (Green, Sedikides, Saltzberg, Wood, & Forzano, 2003; Sedikides, 1992a). 
Furthermore, mood momentarily changes the structure of the accessible self-concept. 
Compared to those in a neutral mood, participants in a happy or sad mood use fewer 
dimensions to describe themselves (DeSteno & Salovey, 1997). 
Transient mood also influences the available content – and, thus, valence – of the self-
concept, most often in a mood-congruent manner (Sedikides, 1992b, 1994). That is, positive 
moods tend to increase the accessibility of favorable self-relevant information, whereas 
negative moods tend to increase the accessibility of unfavorable self-relevant information. 
Most explanations of this mood-self congruency effect view it through one of two lenses: (a) 
cognitive—such that the accessibility of valenced information guides subsequent attention 
and knowledge retrieval, or (b) motivational—such that people are motivated to maintain 
their mood and, thus, attend to mood-congruent information (Sedikides, 1992b).  
Mood-self congruency is not always observed, however. Congruency between a 
transient mood and a person’s self-concept is less likely for central (vs. peripheral) aspects 
(Sedikides, 1995). Central self-aspects are more certain, strongly valenced, elaborated, 
consolidated, diagnostic and, critically for our aims, more likely to be perceived as 
representing the true self (Sedikides, 1993, 1995). Based on the Affect Infusion Model (AIM; 
Forgas, 1995), Sedikides (1995) argued that mood is less likely to influence judgments 
regarding central aspects of the self-concept, because these judgments are made using 
motivated processing (i.e., processing aimed at the achievement of a pre-existing goal) or by 
directly accessing relevant stored information. In contrast, judgments concerning peripheral 
self aspects are made in the moment using either heuristic or substantive (i.e., transformative 
rather than reproductive) processing. According to the AIM, only heuristic and substantive 
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processing allow for affect to infuse the judgment (Forgas, 1995), hence the apparent 
resistance of central self aspects to mood manipulations (Sedikides, 1995). This same 
research (Sedikides, 1995) further suggests that mood influences peripheral self-aspects via 
affective priming (i.e., whereby similarly-valenced information in memory becomes 
accessible) rather than via an affect-as-information (i.e., heuristic-inferential; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1988; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002) mechanism.  
The above-described findings imply that the true (core) self is impervious to irrelevant 
influence—at least irrelevant affective influence. However, all of that research takes a 
relatively cognitive view of the self. That is, the experiments assessed the self with respect to 
cognitive associations, cognitive structure, or attention. It thus remains unclear what the 
relation is between incidental affect and the subjective or phenomenological self.  
Affect and Authenticity 
Although theorizing about authenticity extends as far back as the Greek philosophers 
(Harter, 2002), and the seeds of interest in this concept were sown in psychology’s earliest 
days (Vannini & Franzese, 2008), it is in the past few years that researchers have begun to 
investigate authenticity as a state (i.e., a situational phenomenon; Fleeson & Wilt, 2010; 
Gino, Norton, & Ariely, 2010; Heppner, et al., 2008; Lenton et al., 2012; Schlegel, Hicks, 
Arndt, & King, 2009). Accordingly, understanding of the precursors, functions, and 
consequences of this state is limited.  
In the investigations that have assessed the subjective (felt) experience of authenticity, 
participants have been asked to explicitly rate the extent to which they: experience this aspect 
of myself as an authentic part of who I am (p. 1383; Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi, 
1997), feel alienated from myself (Gino et al., 2010, p. 7), or are in touch with my ‘true self’ 
(Heppner et al., 2008, p. 1141). Evidence suggests that this subjective sense of authenticity is 
associated with participants’ affect. For example, Heppner et al.’s (2008) study showed that 
daily variation in felt authenticity was correlated with more positive and less negative affect. 
Also, Sheldon and colleagues (1997) reported that the more authentic a participant felt in a 
role (e.g., student, friend), the more satisfied she or he was in that role.  
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Additionally, Turner and Billings (1991) examined personal descriptions of authenticity 
and inauthenticity experiences and found that true-self situations possess a more positive 
emotional ambience than false-self situations. Rice and Pasupathi (2010) obtained similar 
findings: Self-consistent events comprised more positive than negative emotions (at least for 
older adults), whereas self-discrepant events comprised more negative than positive emotions. 
Lenton et al.’s (2012) examination of authentic and inauthentic narrative descriptions 
corroborated the associations between authenticity and positive affect and between 
inauthenticity and negative affect. Lenton et al. further demonstrated that discrete positive 
emotions such as contentment, relaxation, and enthusiasm are related to authenticity, whereas 
negative emotions such as anxiety, sadness, and disappointment are related to inauthenticity. 
These findings, however, are all correlational. As such, they cannot inform researchers 
whether affect is a precursor to or an outcome of felt authenticity.  
Yet, let us imagine that these had been experimental studies demonstrating that 
incidental affect influenced the subjective sense of authenticity: Why would that be so? From 
the perspective of the AIM (Forgas, 1995), such a finding would imply that judgments 
concerning the self’s authenticity are made in the moment (‘online’) using either heuristic or 
substantive processing. Online judgments are vulnerable to affect infusion. Positive affect 
would yield increased authenticity and negative affect would yield increased inauthenticity 
(relative to neutral affect), because individuals use their mood to infer their authenticity (e.g., 
“I feel good, therefore I must be integrated and organized”; that is, affect is used as 
information; Schwarz & Strack, 1999) or because mood renders different information 
accessible (e.g., “I feel good, which makes me recall more positive, authenticity-consistent 
information about myself”).  
Research indicates that self-concept formation is indeed largely an online – rather than 
a memory-based – process, but only when the individual expects to behave consistently 
across time (McConnell, Rydell, & Leibold, 2002). This research further indicates that, in 
general, people do expect behavioral consistency in themselves. Thus, it follows that 
judgments concerning the self typically will be made online. Additionally, we assume that 
judging one’s current authenticity is similar to judging one’s general life satisfaction, in that 
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both are complex judgments relying on the integration of numerous, ill-defined attributes 
(Schwarz & Strack, 1999). Complex judgments tend to be constructed “on the fly” rather than 
be retrieved (Forgas, 1995). If the assessment of one's own authenticity is indeed abstract, 
then incidental affect is likely to infuse that assessment, perhaps via the “how do I feel about 
it” heuristic (Schwarz & Clore, 1988; Slovic et al., 2002) or the retrieval of mood-congruent 
information (Forgas, 1995). 
Personality systems interaction (PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000) also suggests that affect will 
influence the sense of authenticity, but for different reasons than the AIM. According to PSI 
theory, the self is a parallel-processing system that acts on “extended networks of cognitive-
affective representations of autobiographical experiences, motives, and emotional 
preferences” (Koole & Kuhl, 2003, p. 44). Furthermore, the self-system is believed to be 
integral to the regulation of positive and negative affect, such that this system becomes 
inhibited in threatening situations (i.e., in the presence of negative affect), but activated when 
negative affect is down-regulated or positive affect is maintained (Koole & Kuhl, 2003). That 
is, negative affect leads to reduced, and positive affect to maintained (if not increased), access 
to the self-system. Cognitive access to the self is, therefore, thought to facilitate authentic 
functioning, as judgments and behavioral tendencies will be grounded in (mostly implicit) 
knowledge of prior experiences and goals. It is not known, however, whether access to the 
self-system translates into the conscious experience of authenticity. Still, based on the 
theorizing and findings related to both the AIM and PSI theory, we expect incidental affect to 
influence state authenticity. 
Overview 
In three experiments, we examined whether incidental affect – induced in a variety of 
ways – influences the sense of authenticity. Affect has been shown to be an outcome of 
authenticity, but it remains to be seen whether the reverse holds true. We also wanted to 
assess whether affect’s impact on authenticity (if observed) could be better explained by the 
AIM (i.e., affect infuses self-assessed authenticity through the affect-as-information effect or 
through affective priming) or by PSI theory (i.e., affect impacts self-assessed authenticity by 
moderating access to the self system). The findings have both theoretical and applied 
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implications. With respect to the former, they add to the growing body of research identifying 
the causes – not just outcomes – of felt authenticity. With respect to the latter, given that 
psychotherapists seek to cultivate authenticity among their clients (Corey, 2009; Rogers, 
1961), it is important to determine how people attain it, who can attain it, how people 
recognize it in themselves, and what its beneficial functions are. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 We used movie clips to induce differential affect among participants (happy, neutral, 
sad; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). In addition to providing a first test of the causal role of 
mood in authenticity, the current experiment provided a test of PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000), 
which postulates that positive and negative affect modulate activation of the self system. That 
is, an increase in positive affect fosters a holistic processing mode, which yields greater 
access to the self system. In contrast, an increase in negative affect fosters an analytic 
processing mode, which reduces access to the self system. Such access is believed to facilitate 
authenticity (Kuhl & Koole, 2003). Individual differences in the ability to maintain positive 
affect and down-regulate negative affect may, thus, potentially moderate the effect of 
situational mood on felt authenticity. To address this proposal, we administered a measure of 
subjective happiness, as this construct represents a chronic ability to maintain positive and 
down-regulate negative affect (Lyubomirsky, 2001; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). For 
example, according to the construal theory of happiness, some people are happier than others 
because they possess cognitions and motivations ‒ such as positive illusions, adaptive social 
comparisons, avoidance of negative self-rumination ‒ that serve to maintain ongoing 
happiness and regulate transient affect (Lyubomirsky). Support for PSI theory would be 
evidenced by finding that negative mood contributes to a diminished sense of authenticity, 
but only for those who are less adept at down regulating negative affect (i.e., those low in 
general happiness). That is, an interaction between the subjective happiness measure and the 
mood manipulation would lend support to this aspect of PSI theory. 
Method 
Participants 
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We tested 120 University of Edinburgh students who took part for either course credit 
or payment. We excluded the responses of eight participants, because they completed the 
measures in the wrong order (two due to a survey stapling error, six due to not following 
instructions). The final sample consisted of 112 participants, 89 of whom were women and 23 
men, ranging in age from 18 to 31 years (M = 20.23, SD = 2.12).  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were advised that they would take part in two separate studies. The first 
involved watching a video and answering questions about it, and the second involved a short 
survey of their “attitudes and beliefs.” The experimenter explained the sequence of events 
that the participant (one at a time) was to undertake and then showed the participant to a chair 
in a cubicle containing a desk and computer. Next, the participant responded to the four-item 
Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). This scale assesses 
subjective feelings of global happiness with one’s life (e.g., “Compared to most of my peers I 
consider myself to be happy”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and served to 
measure dispositional mood. The SHS was internally consistent (α = .86). This survey also 
contained demographic items (gender, age). Between being seated in the cubicle and 
completing the dependent measures participants had no contact with the experimenter, in 
order to minimize potential interference with the mood manipulation. 
When they finished responding to the SHS, participants put on headphones and pressed 
play on the computer’s media player. The computer had been set up to show one of three 
videos, each of which was intended to induce a distinct mood: (a) Control—a sequence of 
film depicting sea life from Part 1 of the BBC’s documentary series Deep Blue (duration = 9 
min 3 sec); (b) Sad—an edited series of heart-rending clips from television (Friends) and film 
(The Champ, The Lion King, My Girl; duration = 12 min 21 sec); or (c) Happy—an edited 
series of humorous clips from television (Friends, Whose Line is it Anyway?), film (Ice Age, 
Love Actually), and the Internet (panda sneezing, laughing baby; duration = 7 min 30 sec). 
Some of these clips (The Champ, The Lion King) have been shown to be effective in evoking 
the intended mood in previous research (Rottenberg et al., 2007).We used the underwater 
documentary sequence as our control film based on the proposal that control conditions 
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should relax and hold participants’ attention (Rottenberg et al., 2007). We selected the happy 
clips for their similarity with the sad induction (animation format, Friends) and for their high 
obtained frequency when searching for “funny/iest” and “happy/iest” clips on the Internet. 
After watching the assigned video, participants proceeded to “Survey 1,” the post-film 
questionnaire, in which the 20-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was embedded (among other items); the PANAS served as our 
manipulation check. Participants indicated (1= not at all/none, 9 = extremely/a great deal) the 
extent to which they experienced each of 10 positive affective states (e.g., enthusiastic, 
excited) and each of 10 negative affective states (e.g., upset, distressed) while watching the 
film sequence. Both the positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) scales were internally 
consistent (α = .83 and .88, respectively) and significantly, albeit weakly, inversely correlated 
with one another [r(110) = -.19, p = .04].  
After the post-film questionnaire, participants completed “Survey 2,” which contained 
two measures of state authenticity (order counter-balanced across participants). One was the 
real-self overlap scale (RSOS), which we developed as a means to assess rapidly the feeling 
that one is being real/authentic (Erickson, 1995; Harter, 2002). That is, we sought to employ a 
relatively intuitive, global, and phenomenological measure of state authenticity for use in this 
series of experiments. The RSOS’s form was inspired by the Inclusion of the Other in the Self 
Scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992), a single-item, pictorial measure of the extent to which 
one person feels close to another; different levels of closeness are depicted by varying levels 
of overlap between two circles (such that no overlap suggests great distance, whereas near-
perfect overlap suggests complete immersion). Similarly, the RSOS assesses the extent to 
which participants – at a particular moment – feel close to their real, true self. The RSOS 
depicts six pairs of circles, varying in degree of overlap between them. The left-hand circle in 
each pair represents “who you are right now,” whereas the right-hand circle in each pair 
represents “your real self (i.e., who you truly are).” Participants were instructed to indicate 
which pair of circles “best represents how close you feel at this moment to your real self.” If 
participants selected the pair that were furthest apart, they were assigned a score of 1; if they 
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selected the pair with the greatest overlap, they were assigned a score of 6 (with the other 
pairs being assigned the ordered scores in between). 
The second assessment of state authenticity was an adapted version of Wood et al.’s 
(2008) 12-item measure of dispositional authenticity. In particular, we adapted the wording of 
the items to assess momentary – rather than more enduring – beliefs and feelings about the 
self (e.g., “I feel out of touch with the real me”  “Right now, I feel out of touch with the 
real me”; 1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). This state version of the authenticity 
scale was internally consistent (α = .85). 
Table 1 shows the simple bivariate correlations between the RSOS and the state version 
of Wood et al.’s (2008) authenticity scale. Of the three Wood et al. (2008) subscales, the 
RSOS had the strongest (negative) association with self-alienation, which is the most 
feelings-focused of the subscales; but the RSOS and self-alienation were not redundant. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Within the context of a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), we examined the 
effects of two contrasts — sad versus control, control versus happy — on self-reported affect 
(PA minus NA). The overall (omnibus) main effect of mood condition was significant, F(2, 
109) = 43.14, p = .001, ηρ² = .44. Tests showed, however, that only the contrast comparing 
the sad (M = .19, SE = .25) and control (M = 2.88, SE = .25) conditions was significant, z = 
6.38, p = .001, d = 1.78.
2
  The control and happy (M = 3.17, SE = .24) conditions did not 
differ, z = 1.25, p  = .211, d = .19.  In other words, the manipulation successfully evoked a 
relatively negative mood, but not a relatively positive mood.  
Hypothesis Testing 
In light of the manipulation check results, we tested our hypothesis using the following 
contrasts, expecting only the first to reveal a significant effect of mood on state authenticity: 
(a) sad versus others; (b) control versus happy. 
                                                 
2
 The statistical notation ηρ² refers to partial eta-squared and d refers to Cohen's d, both of which are indicators 
of effect size. 
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State authenticity. First we examined the effect of the mood manipulation on the real-
self overlap scale (RSOS) using a one-way ANOVA with the a priori contrasts defined as just 
described. The omnibus effect of mood on this measure was significant, F(2, 109) = 6.57, p = 
.002, ηρ² = .11. As anticipated, the contrast comparing the sad (M = 3.81, SE = .18) with the 
other (M = 4.53, SE = .19) conditions was significant (z = 3.27, p = .001, d = .64,), whereas 
the contrast comparing the control (M = 4.36, SE = .18) and the happy (M = 4.69, SE = .17) 
conditions was not (z = 1.46, p = .144, d = .34). Participants in a sad mood reported 
significantly less real-self overlap than participants in the happy/control conditions, whereas 
the authenticity of participants in the control and happy conditions did not differ (as these 
latter two conditions were not affectively distinct from one another). 
Next, we examined the effect of the mood manipulation on the state version of Wood 
et al.’s (2008) authenticity scale. Accordingly, we conducted a mixed-model ANOVA with 
mood condition as the between-subjects factor (using the same a priori contrasts) and the 
three subscales of the adapted Wood et al. (2008) measure as a within-subjects variable. The 
omnibus effect of mood was nonsignificant, F(2, 109) = .78, p = .463, ηρ² = .01. Accordingly, 
neither contrast was a significant predictor of overall state authenticity: (a) sad (M = 4.79, SE 
= .15) versus others (M = 4.99, SE = .08), z = 1.25, p = .211, d = .24; (b) control (M = 5.01, 
SE = .13) versus happy (M = 4.97, SE = .11),  z = -.234, p = .815, d = -.06. Further, the 
(nonsignificant) omnibus effect of mood did not depend on subscale, F(2, 218) = 1.04, p = 
.385, ηp
2
 = .02. Mood had no reliable effect on this measure of state authenticity. 
Moderation. To examine whether the mood-authenticity relation depended on whether 
participants were relatively happy versus sad in the first place (i.e., individual differences in 
mood-regulation abilities), we re-ran the analyses of mood condition’s effects on the two 
measures of state authenticity, but now with SHS (standardized) included as a potential 
moderator. For both the RSOS and the state version of Wood et al.’s (2008) authenticity 
scale, interactions between mood condition (omnibus) and the SHS were nonsignificant: (a) 
condition × SHS for the RSOS, F(2, 96) = 1.62, p = .204, η
2
 = .03; (b) condition × SHS for 
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the overall adapted authenticity scale: F(2, 96) = .04, p = .957, ηp
2
 = .001; (c)  condition × 
SHS × authenticity subscale,  F(4, 192) = 1.81, p = .128, ηp
2
 = .04.  
Summary 
Mood influenced participants’ sense of authenticity, such that those in a sad mood felt 
less authentic than those in the happy and control conditions—at least when state authenticity 
was measured with a global-affective scale. Perhaps mood had no effect on the state version 
of the Wood et al. (2008) authenticity scale, because it was a more domain-specific 
assessment of authenticity than the RSOS. For example, mood is more likely to infuse global 
judgments of life satisfaction (i.e., life in general) than domain-specific judgments of life 
satisfaction (e.g., job satisfaction), because the latter are less cognitively demanding (Schwarz 
& Strack, 1999; our Experiment 3 contained both dependent measures, allowing us to assess 
this hypothesis further). There was no evidence that dispositional mood moderated the effect 
of a temporary mood on state authenticity as predicted by PSI theory. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
To assess whether mood can impact state authenticity more implicitly, we used the 
facial feedback paradigm (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988) to manipulate affective state 
(happy, neutral/control, or sad). We then provided participants with a measure of authenticity 
embedded within a set of other tasks. The facial feedback hypothesis suggests that arranging 
the musculature of the face so that it generates a facial expression of emotion will 
automatically and unconsciously evoke the corresponding affective state (Dimberg, 1988; 
Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995). Accordingly, we expected that participants who unknowingly 
produced a smile (i.e., happiness) would increase their sense of authenticity, whereas 
participants who unknowingly produced a frown (i.e., sadness) would decrease their sense of 
authenticity (compared to those producing a relatively neutral expression). Using an implicit 
mood manipulation enabled us to test the automaticity of potential influences of affect on 
authenticity, thus ruling out alternative explanations concerning social desirability or 
experimental demand. This mood manipulation also does not suffer from Experiment 1's 
methodological limitation  (i.e., the differential duration of the videos used to manipulate 
mood may have contributed to the ineffective induction of relative happiness). Finally, the 
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implicit manipulation of mood also allowed us to assess the potential boundaries of the effect. 
Perhaps explicit recognition that one’s mood has changed is necessary in order to infer 
something about one’s authenticity.  
Method 
Participants 
As part of a class project, University of Edinburgh psychology undergraduate students 
recruited 411 volunteer participants for our experiment. Of these, we excluded the responses 
of 22 participants: eight because they reported being less than 18 years of age (contrary to our 
recruitment instructions), 13 because they expressed suspicion about the cover story, and one 
because s/he omitted the survey’s last page. Of the final 389 participants, 155 were women 
and 234 were men, ranging in age between 18 and 74 years (M = 23.95, SD = 10.43).  
Materials and Procedure 
The experimenter informed participants (one at a time) that this experiment examines 
how psycho-motor coordination impacts physically-impaired performance and, thus, it tests 
the ability to manipulate objects simultaneously with different parts of the body (Strack et al., 
1988). Accordingly, the experimenter instructed participants to hold a pencil (or pen) in their 
mouth while they performed various tasks. The position in which the pencil was to be held 
depended on condition: happy, neutral/control, or sad. Participants in the happy condition 
were instructed to hold the pencil firmly between their front teeth and to avoid touching it 
with their lips (producing a smile). Participants in the control condition were told to hold the 
pencil gently between their teeth, with their lips open so as not to touch the pencil (producing 
a neutral expression). Participants in the sad condition were advised to hold the pencil tightly 
with their lips, making sure not to allow their teeth to touch it (producing a frown). The 
experimenter demonstrated the assigned pose and, importantly, did not mention the facial 
expression that the given technique should induce. 
Participants reproduced the demonstrated pencil-holding technique and were directed to 
hold this pose while they completed a brief survey comprising four tasks ostensibly assessing 
their motor skills, perceptual skills, and objective and subjective cognition (in order). The 
motor skills task asked participants to connect five digits by tracing a line. The perceptual 
RUNNING HEAD: Mood and State Authenticity 15  
 
skills task asked participants to rate their perception of Chinese characters (i.e., pleasantness 
vs. unpleasantness, squaredness vs. roundedness). The objective cognition task contained two 
analytical GRE questions. Finally, the subjective cognition task included the RSOS (in this 
and the next experiment, the RSOS depicted seven rather than six pairs of circles), one item 
assessing current mood (the “pleasure” Self Assessment Manikin, or SAM, which depicts a 
series of seven expressive figures, from a smiling to a frowning one; Bradley & Lang, 1994), 
and a third filler item. The pleasure SAM was the manipulation check. At the end of each 
category (motor skills, perceptual skills, objective cognition, subjective cognition), 
participants rated the difficulty of completing the given task when holding the pencil in their 
mouth (1 = not at all difficult, 7 = very difficult). This question served to reinforce the cover 
story and allowed us to rule out an alternative explanation for any observed effect of 
condition on state authenticity; i.e., that the facial expressions differed in how easy they were 
to hold and that it was this difference, rather than the intended mood, that influenced state 
authenticity. 
We had only one measure of state authenticity (RSOS) in this study, because of 
practical constraints (i.e., the class project necessitated a study that could be quickly 
administered by the experimenters). Given the implicit nature of the mood manipulation as 
well as the findings of Experiment 1, we thought that this more intuitive, global measure of 
state authenticity would be more likely than the adapted Wood et al. (2008) scale to capture 
mood-induced variability in authenticity. 
For the final page of the survey, participants removed the pencil from their mouth and 
answered questions assessing their demographic characteristics (gender, age), compliance 
with the task instructions, and suspicion: (a) Tell us your understanding of the purpose of the 
study; (b) Were there any aspects of the study that did not make sense to you? 
Results 
Manipulation Check  
To test the effect of the manipulation on incidental affect (the pleasure SAM), we again 
used a one-way ANOVA to compare the sad with the control condition and the happy with 
the control condition. The omnibus effect of the mood condition was significant, F(2, 386) = 
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4.29, p = .014, ηp
2
 = .02. As in Experiment 1, however, the tests of the contrasts showed that 
the sad condition (M = 4.55, SE = .13) differed from the control condition (M = 4.92, SE = 
.11; z = 2.22, p = .026, d = .28), but the happy condition (M = 5.02, SE = .13) did not (z = .61, 
p = .544, d = .08).  
State Authenticity 
Because the manipulation successfully induced a relatively negative mood, but not a 
relatively positive mood, hypothesis-testing again examined two distinct contrasts: (a) sad 
versus others; (b) happy versus control. We expected only the former contrast to yield an 
effect on state authenticity. 
Basic model. The omnibus test of mood condition on the RSOS was marginally 
significant, F(2, 386) = 2.56, p = .079, ηp
2
 = .013. The planned contrast comparing the sad (M 
= 4.55, SE = .13) to the other conditions (M = 4.89, SE = .09) was significant, z = 2.16, p = 
.031, d = .28. As with the manipulation check, the contrast comparing the control (M = 4.95, 
SE = .12) to the happy condition (M = 4.83, SE = .13) was not significant, z = -.66, p = .505, d 
= -.08. Participants felt less authentic in the sad than the other conditions, but authenticity did 
not differ between the control and happy conditions (which were not affectively distinct). 
Covariate model. To test whether condition differences in perceived difficulty of the 
set of tasks accounted for the effect of sadness on state authenticity, we re-ran the above 
analysis, but this time controlling for perceived difficulty. We observed the same pattern of 
results: (a) sad (M = 4.57, SE = .13) versus others (M = 4.88, SE = .09), z = 1.97, p = .049, d = 
.21; (b) control (M = 4.90, SE = .13) versus happy (M = 4.85, SE = .13), z = -.27, p = .786, d = 
-.03. Regardless of how difficult they found the assigned facial expression, participants in the 
sad condition felt less authentic than those in the other conditions, who did not differ from 
one another. 
Summary 
Using a direct manipulation of mood (i.e., video clips), Experiment 1 provided initial 
evidence that incidental negative affect can influence the sense of authenticity. Using a more 
subtle, implicit manipulation of mood (i.e., the facial feedback paradigm), Experiment 2 also 
found that sad participants felt less authentic than control/happy participants.  
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EXPERIMENT 3 
 Experiment 3 had three goals: (a) to replicate the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 using 
an alternative direct mood manipulation, in the hopes of successfully inducing a positive 
mood (i.e., music + instruction; Westerman, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996); (b) to examine 
directly the viability of the AIM versus PSI explanations for mood’s influence on the 
subjective sense of authenticity; and (c) to rule out another potential alternative explanation 
for the results. 
With respect to the second goal, again, PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000) proposes that the self-
system becomes inhibited in threatening situations, whereas it becomes activated (salient) 
when negative affect is down-regulated or positive affect is maintained. Authenticity is 
believed by some researchers to depend on (perhaps implicit) self-awareness (Koole & Kuhl, 
2003). Thus, the relation between mood and the sense of authenticity may be mediated by 
access to the self system. That is, perhaps positive mood (versus negative mood) makes the 
self-concept accessible, in turn leading to an increased sense of authenticity. To test this 
proposal, Experiment 3 measured true-self accessibility (Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimons, 
2002; Schlegel et al., 2009) following the mood manipulation.  
PSI theory further suggests that individual differences in affect regulation moderate the 
effects of mood on access to the self system, such that individuals who are adept at down-
regulating negative affect may still maintain access to the self system under stressful 
conditions (Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2007; Koole & Kuhl, 2003). To test this possibility, 
Experiment 3 assessed individual differences in chronic ability to down-regulate negative 
affect with three different measures: the Subjective Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 
1999), the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995), and 
the Emotional Regulation Scale (Gross & John, 2003). Support for this aspect of PSI theory 
would be shown by an interaction between each measure and the mood manipulation: That is, 
the mood manipulation should only influence the state authenticity of those who are poor 
emotion regulators. 
In contrast to PSI theory, the AIM (Forgas, 1995) implies that the judgment of one’s 
own authenticity may be vulnerable to affect infusion, because the judgment is made online 
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using either heuristic or substantive processing. Evidence for a substantive processing (i.e., 
affective priming) account would be obtained by a mood-congruent bias in self-related 
information processing. As described previously, past studies have demonstrated that mood 
influences the available content of the self-concept in a mood-congruent way (Sedikides, 
1992a, 1994). That is, positive mood facilitates the retrieval of favorable self-related 
information, whereas negative mood facilitates the retrieval of unfavorable self-related 
information. Perhaps this differential accessibility of positive versus negative self-related 
information contributes to the sense of authenticity or inauthenticity, respectively. 
Experiment 3 enabled us to test this proposition. 
Self-esteem represents a global, valenced evaluation of the self (Brown, Dutton, & 
Cook, 2001; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003), and it has strong theoretical and empirical links to 
both affect (Brown & Marshall, 2001; Neiss et al., 2005) and authenticity (Goldman, 2006; 
Heppner et al, 2008; Wood et al., 2008). As with authenticity, affect is typically viewed as an 
outcome of, rather than a precursor to, self-esteem (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, 
& Schimel, 2004; Sedikides & Alicke, 2012). Also like authenticity, self-esteem has been 
theorized to serve a signaling function. For example, sociometer theory (Leary, 2006) 
proposes that self-esteem alerts individuals to real or imagined threats to their social 
relationships and standing: If self-esteem is low, then the individual is motivated to take 
action to facilitate approval and inclusion by others. In light of the inter-relatedness of the 
constructs of interest (affect and authenticity) with self-esteem, it is crucial to rule out the 
possibility that self-esteem and authenticity are simply different words for the same construct. 
Accordingly, Experiment 3 included state self-esteem as a potential mediator. If the effect of 
mood on state authenticity is not completely mediated by self-esteem, we will have 
demonstrated the discriminant validity of state authenticity from self-esteem.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 145 students at the University of Edinburgh who received either 
course credit or payment. Of these, 113 were women and 32 were men, ranging in age 
between 18 and 45 years (M = 20.75, SD = 3.66).  
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Materials and Procedure 
The recruitment announcement informed potential participants that they would take part 
in two separate studies. The ostensible first study was an Internet survey focused on how 
people experience everyday states, whereas the ostensible second study was a lab-based 
experiment examining how people interpret music.  
The online survey assessed the true-self concept and several individual differences that 
could moderate the effects of mood on state authenticity.  We measured the true-self concept 
with a method developed by Schlegel et al. (2009; see also Vess, Arndt, Routledge, 
Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2012). This task makes use of a list of 60 personality traits chosen 
from the normative likeability ratings of Anderson (1968); the list contains equal numbers of 
positive, neutral, and negative personality traits (e.g., intelligent, cautious, lazy). Participants 
were asked to select the 10 traits that best expressed their true/real self. In the present 
experiment, the true/real self was simply described as being “who you truly are (which may 
not necessarily be the same as who you would like to be).” 
Next, participants responded to items from the SHS (α = .88; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 
1999), the trait meta-mood scale (TMMS; α =.90; Salovey et al., 1995), and an emotion 
regulation scale (Gross & John, 2003) assessing reappraisal (α = .87) and suppression (α = 
.69), with the scales’ items being randomly interspersed with one another in a fixed order and 
rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Again, the four-item SHS 
assesses subjective feelings of global happiness with one’s life. The TMMS comprises 30-
items that assess how individuals reflect upon their moods and manage their feelings or 
emotions. The scale has three factors: attention to feelings (i.e., the extent to which a person 
monitors her/his emotions; e.g., “I often think about my feelings”), clarity of feelings (i.e., the 
ability to discriminate between one’s emotions; e.g., “I am usually very clear about my 
feelings”), and emotional repair (i.e., the ability to maintain pleasant mood and down-regulate 
unpleasant mood; e.g., “No matter how badly I feel, I try to think about pleasant things”).  
The emotion regulation scale (Gross & John, 2003) contains 10 items assessing two 
orthogonal emotion regulation strategies: reappraisal (e.g., “When I want to feel less negative 
emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation”) and suppression (e.g., “I control 
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my emotions by not expressing them”). Table 2 reports the simple correlations among the 
trait measures. The survey concluded with demographic items (age, gender). 
We tested participants one at a time in the second part of the experiment, which took 
place within two weeks of completing the online survey. Upon arrival for this “music study,” 
we asked participants to put on headphones so that they could listen to and rate one of three 
pieces of classical music (randomly assigned) for 7 min. We intended the music selections to 
induce a happy (Bach’s Brandenburg Concerto no. 3, played by Hubert Law), neutral 
(Faure’s, ‘Ballade pour Piano and Orchestra,’ opus 19, played at half speed), or sad 
(Prokofiev’s ‘Russia under the Mongolian Yoke,’ played at half speed) mood. Previous 
research (Brown & Mankowski, 1993; Jouriles & Thompson, 1993) and pilot testing aided us 
in the selection of these songs. Additionally, we displayed different visualizations from 
Windows Media Player™ on each participant’s computer screen to strengthen their assigned 
mood condition (i.e., “Ambiance: X Marks the Spot” for the happy condition; “Ambiance: 
Water” for the control condition; “Bars and Waves: Ocean Mist” for the sad condition). We 
instructed participants to listen carefully to the song and to immerse themselves in the 
atmosphere and mood expressed in the music; however, the experimenter was careful to make 
no explicit mention of the intended mood (De l’Etoile, 2002).  
After removing their headphones, but while the music continued to play on the 
speakers, participants completed the ‘Me/Not Me’ computer task, which measured the 
momentary accessibility of their true-self (Schlegel et al., 2009; Schlegel, Hicks, King, & 
Arndt, 2011). This task asked participants to decide as quickly and as accurately as possible 
whether a given trait was self-descriptive or not. Each trial began with a fixation cross in the 
middle of the screen for two seconds. A one-word personality trait then appeared until a 
response (“Me” or “Not me”) was made on the response box (participants were asked to place 
one index finger on each key; left versus right arrangement of the “Me” and “Not Me” keys 
was counterbalanced across participants). Each response was followed by a one-second 
pause, after which a new trial commenced. Participants began with a set of nine practice trials 
followed by the critical trials, comprising of 60 personality traits used to assess the true-self 
in the previously-completed online survey. Accordingly, the 10 traits that participants had 
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identified as expressing their ‘true-self’ were also displayed. Faster reaction times to pressing 
“Me” when the participant’s personal 10 true-self words appeared (vs. “Me” to the other 
words) reflects greater true-self accessibility (Bargh et al., 2002; Schlegel et al., 2009, 2011). 
Following the computer task, we asked participants questions that assessed the 
effectiveness of the manipulation (i.e., “What is the emotional tone of the song you just 
listened to?”, “How do you feel now after listening to this piece of music?”); these items were 
interspersed among other questions related to the music they heard. Participants rated the 
critical items on 7-point scales with the endpoints anchored by relevant labels (e.g., very 
negative vs. very positive, and very sad vs. very happy, respectively). We also assessed the 
mood manipulation with the short-form PANAS (Thompson, 2007); given its (PA minus NA) 
strong correlation with the average of the music-related items (r145  = .56, p = .001), however, 
we only report the results of the former below.  
Next participants completed in a fixed order: (a) two items from the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) that we modified to measure state rather than trait self-
esteem (e.g., “At the moment, I believe that I have many positive characteristics”); (b) two 
items adapted from the private and two items adapted from the public self-consciousness 
scales (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; e.g., private: “At the moment, I am conscious of 
my inner feelings”; public: “At the moment, I feel concerned about what other people think of 
me”); (c) the real-self overlap scale (RSOS); and (d) the state version of Wood et al.’s (2008) 
12-item measure of trait authenticity. The scales had either good internal consistency 
(positive affect or PA: α = .81; negative affect or NA: α = .82; overall authenticity inventory: 
α = .86) or, in the case of two-item measures, at least a moderately strong, positive inter-item 
correlation [self-esteem or SE: r(145) = .72, p = .001; private self-consciousness or PriSC: 
r(145) = .51, p = .001; public self-consciousness or PubSC: r(145) = .63, p = .001]. 
Participants also completed demographic items (e.g., age, gender). Note that the music played 
throughout the entirety of the study. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
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The items assessing the song’s emotional tone and the participant’s mood after the song 
were highly correlated [r(145) = .76, p = .001]; thus, we averaged them to form a mood 
valence measure. We tested the manipulation of mood in a one-way ANOVA, using the same 
two a priori contrasts as before: sad versus control, control versus happy. The omnibus effect 
of the mood manipulation was significant, F(2, 142) = 120.43, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .629. The tests 
showed that both contrasts were significant: Participants in the sad condition (M = 3.24, SE = 
.13) differed from control (M = 3.70, SE = .16; z = 2.18, p = .029, d = .47), and participants in 
the happy condition (M = 5.81, SE = .09) also differed from control (z = 9.17, p = .001, d = 
2.38). The manipulation was therefore effective in inducing a positive as well as a negative 
mood; note, however, that the manipulation of positive affect was much stronger than the 
manipulation of negative affect.  
Data Preparation 
In line with previous research using the true-self accessibility task (Schlegel et al., 
2009; Smith & Henry, 1996), we treated reaction times (RTs) of less than 300 ms as guesses 
and greater than 5000 ms as non-responses, and we eliminated them from the data (0.2 %). 
Additionally, we excluded RTs more than 2.5 SDs away from the average across all 
participants (2.6%) in order to control for univariate outliers (Schlegel et al., 2009). 
Consequently, we conducted statistical analyses involving the true-self accessibility task on 
97.2 % of the response-time data. The included RTs were then log-transformed (natural 
logarithm function) to correct for skewness (Fazio, 1990; Ratcliff, 1993).  
To construct the true-self accessibility variable, we averaged across the response 
latencies to the 10 items identified by each participant in the earlier online survey as 
representative of their true-self (M = 864, SD = 368). We also computed control scores by 
averaging across response latencies to the items that participants identified in the 
computerized task as being self-descriptive (‘Me’) from the remaining 50 traits (M = 1036, 
SD = 507). To improve the quality of the accessibility scores, we then removed individual 
differences in participants’ general response speed by conducting a simple regression 
predicting the true-self scores from the control scores (Schlegel et al., 2009). We used the 
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resulting standardized residuals to represent true-self accessibility (Robinson, 2007). Finally, 
we reversed the residuals so that higher numbers reflect stronger true-self accessibility. 
In light of the mood-self congruency findings (Sedikides, 1992a, 1994), we also 
examined whether self-concept valence accounted for any observed effects of mood on 
authenticity. Stated otherwise, we wanted to know whether the manipulation changed the 
content of the self-concept in a mood-congruent way and, if so, whether this change in self-
concept content valence could account for the effect of mood on felt authenticity. We thus 
created a variable representing mood-self congruency by computing the difference between 
the frequency of positive versus negative traits associated with the self. In particular, we 
subtracted each participant’s number of ‘Me’ responses to negative traits from their number 
of ‘Me’ responses to positive traits in the true-self accessibility task. A resulting positive 
number reflects more self-concept positivity, whereas a negative number reflects more self-
concept negativity. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Because the manipulation check in this study revealed that both experimental 
conditions differed from control, we used the same set of contrasts (sad versus control, 
control versus happy) to test our hypotheses. 
State Authenticity. We first examined the effect of the mood manipulation on the 
real-self overlap scale (RSOS) using a one-way ANOVA. Although the omnibus effect of the 
mood manipulation was not significant [F(2,142) = 2.31, p = .103, η
2
 = .032], the tests of the 
a priori contrasts showed that participants in the happy condition (M = 5.53, SE = .14) felt 
marginally more authentic than those in the control condition (M = 5.11, SE = .19; z = 1.80, p 
= .072, d = .36). Participants in the sad (M = 5.07, SE = .19) and control conditions did not 
differ (z = .15, p = .885, d = .03).  
We next examined the effect of the mood manipulation on the state version of Wood 
et al.’s (2008) authenticity scale. To do so, we conducted a mixed-model ANOVA with mood 
condition as the between-subjects factor (using the same a priori contrasts) and the three 
subscales of the adapted Wood et al. (2008) measure as a within-subjects variable. The 
omnibus effect of the mood manipulation was significant [F(2,142) = 5.30, p = .006, η
2
 = 
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.069]. The contrast comparing the happy (M = 5.36, SE = .14) to the control condition was 
significant (z = 2.65, p = .008, d = .54), whereas that comparing the sad (M = 4.81, SE = .13) 
to the control condition (M = 4.82, SE = .15) was non-significant (z = .06, p = .952, d = .01). 
Participants in the happy mood condition felt more authentic than those in the control 
condition (who felt no more authentic than those in the sad condition). The effect of condition 
did not depend further on subscale, F(4,284) = 1.32, p = .262, ηp
2
 = .018. 
Mediation. To examine whether the effect of mood (happy vs. control) on state 
authenticity could be explained by any of our potential mediators (i.e., true-self accessibility, 
mood-self congruency, SE, PriSC, and PubSC), we conducted two bootstrap analyses 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008). For both, we set the confidence interval to 95% (α = .05) and the 
sample size to 5000 (Hayes, 2009). Table 2 shows the simple correlations among these 
potential mediators, as well as between each mediator and both measures of state authenticity. 
State authenticity as measured by the RSOS was positively related to mood-self congruency 
and SE, but negatively associated with PubSC. State authenticity as measured by the state 
version of the Wood et al. (2008) scale was positively related to true-self accessibility, mood-
self congruency, and SE, but negatively associated with PubSC. 
In the first bootstrap analysis, we entered the RSOS as the dependent variable, the two 
mood contrasts as the predictors, and the five potential mediators simultaneously into the 
Mediate SPSS macro (Hayes & Preacher, 2011).  The indirect effect of mood (happy vs. 
control) on the RSOS through each of the potential mediators was not significant: (a) true-self 
concept accessibility: a × b = -.007, SEa×b = .025, 95% CI = -.064 to .041; (b) mood-self 
congruency: a × b = .012, SEa×b = .026, 95% CI = -.04 to .069; (c) SE: a × b = .029, SEa×b = 
.04, 95% CI = -.035 to .127; (d) PriSC: a × b = -.007, SEa×b = .04, 95% CI = -.087 to .078; 
(e) PubSC: a × b = .039, SEa×b = .035, 95% CI = -.012 to .120.  
We next conducted a similar analysis on the state version of Wood et al.’s (2008) 
authenticity scale (as a unitary measure, given that the effect of mood did not depend on 
subscale). The indirect effect of mood condition (happy vs. control) on the state version of 
Wood et al.’s (2008) scale through each of the five potential mediators was not significant: 
(a) true-self concept accessibility: a × b = .024, SEa×b = .02, 95% CI = -.004 to .069; (b) 
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mood-self congruency: a × b = .003, SEa×b = .01, 95% CI = -.019 to .023; (c) SE: a × b = 
.05, SEa×b = .06, 95% CI = -.065 to .175; (d) PriSC: a × b = -.004, SEa×b = .02, 95% CI = -
.049 to .042; (e) PubSC: a × b = .048, SEa×b = .033, 95% CI = -.002 to .13.  
Moderation. To examine whether the effect of mood on the RSOS was moderated by 
any of the assessed individual differences (SHS, TMMS, emotional regulation), we entered 
the mood manipulation, the (standardized) trait measure (one at a time), and their interaction 
as predictors of this measure. These analyses revealed no significant Trait x Mood 
interactions, all Fs < .980, ps >.378, ηp
2
s < .014.  We carried out similar analyses for the state 
version of Wood et al.’s (2008) authenticity scale. No significant Trait x Mood interactions 
emerged, all Fs < 1.12, ps > . 330, ηp
2
s < .016.  
Summary 
Situationally-induced mood influenced the sense of authenticity. People in a happy 
mood reported being more authentic than people in either a neutral or sad mood. None of 
true-self accessibility, mood-self congruency, state self-esteem, state public self-
consciousness, or state private self-consciousness accounted for the effect of mood on state 
authenticity.  
That the effect of mood on authenticity was neither mediated by true-self accessibility 
nor moderated by any of the individual differences measures lends support to our suggestion 
following Experiment 1 that PSI theory cannot explain the results. Explicit self-awareness – 
either public or private – also failed to explain the effect of mood on authenticity. Moreover 
positive mood did not impact true-self accessibility, as predicted by PSI theory [happy vs. 
control mood: t(142) = 1.52, p = .131, d = .304; sad vs. control mood: t(142) = .052, p = .958, 
d = .011]. 
Furthermore, mood did not influence the accessible self-concept in a mood-congruent 
manner, as expected by the affective priming account [happy vs. control mood: t(142) = .234, 
p = .815, d = .049; sad vs. control mood: t(142) = -.388, p = .699, d = .078]. The effect of 
mood on state authenticity was not mediated by mood-self congruency, suggesting that a 
mood effect on substantive processing cannot explain the results. Altogether, the findings of 
Experiment 3 accord with an affect-as-information (Schwarz & Clore, 1988; Slovic et al., 
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2002) account of the effect of mood on state authenticity. Put in AIM’s terminology (Forgas, 
1995), this experiment indicates that the sense of authenticity is evaluated in the moment 
using heuristic processing.  
Experiment 3 also supported the construct validity of the two state authenticity 
measures. As Table 2 illustrates, state authenticity was correlated in theoretically expected 
ways with other related-but-distinct constructs, though these correlations were not so high as 
to suggest that state authenticity is redundant with them. In particular, Experiment 3 
demonstrated that self-esteem and state authenticity are independent constructs.  
MINI META-ANALYSIS 
Given the variability in the success of some aspects of the mood manipulations and that 
the two measures of state authenticity yielded different results across the three experiments, 
we undertook a mini meta-analysis in order to assess the average magnitude of the effect. As 
Giner-Sorolla (2012) has recently argued, researchers tend to overlook “aesthetically flawed 
evidence,” even when that evidence is otherwise strong; to ameliorate this, he suggests that 
“reliance on the p < .05 standard, study by study, (should) be replaced by a consideration of 
evidence across multiple sources of replication” (p. 567).  
To that end, we conducted a meta-analysis. This analysis took into account the 
redundancy between the two dependent variable measures, by averaging across them in 
Experiments 1 and 3. Table 3 shows two panels of results. The top panel (“All Contrasts”) 
gives the complete set of effect sizes for each of the two contrasts: sad versus control, happy 
versus control. As seen there, the fixed-effect model, which reflects more accurately the mean 
overall effect of our studies (Hedges, 1994), indicates that, on average, mood significantly 
influenced state authenticity in the hypothesized direction. The random-effects model 
suggests that this relationship is marginal. However, both the fixed-effect and random-effects 
models in the top panel are likely to be underestimates, given that the mood manipulations 
were not equally effective across the contrasts in each experiment. That is, in Experiments 1 
and 2, only the manipulation of sadness (vs control) was successful and, thus, happiness was 
not actually induced in those studies; thus, there was no reason to expect that the contrast 
comparing the happy to the control condition would have an effect on state authenticity.  
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The bottom panel (“Effective Contrasts”), which depicts the results when only those 
contrasts that successfully induced mood were included (note: in Experiment 3, where both 
contrasts were successful, these were averaged), shows that the effect sizes associated with 
both the fixed-effect and random-effects models were significant. Finally, we conducted a 
regression analysis predicting the size of the mood effect on authenticity (Hedges' gs from top 
half of Table 3) from the size of the manipulation's effect on mood (the ds associated with 
each contrast across the Experiments). Even for this small sample of six data points, the 
relationship was significant and sizable, F(1, 4) = 8.76, p = .042, R
2
 = .69.  Bigger changes in 
mood led to bigger changes in felt authenticity. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Participants felt more authentic when in a relatively good than bad mood. Notably, 
this effect occurred even though the manipulated affect was incidental (vs. integral; 
Bodenhausen, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and regardless of whether the manipulation was 
explicit (Experiments 1 and 3) or implicit (Experiment 2). Additionally, the mood-
authenticity relation was not explained by a conceptual confound between state self-esteem 
and state authenticity, by positive affect rendering the self system more accessible, by causing 
people to explicitly focus upon themselves (either publicly or privately), or by the 
manipulation making salient a mood-consistent self-concept (Experiment 3). Furthermore, the 
effect was not moderated by individual differences in the ability to maintain positive or 
down-regulate negative affect (Experiments 1 and 3). The mini meta-analysis showed that the 
average effect of mood on state authenticity across the studies was reliable, especially when 
taking into account the relative success of the different mood manipulations. 
These results indicate that this judgment is made online (in the moment) using 
heuristic (“how do I feel about it?”), rather than substantive, processing (Forgas, 1995). 
Specifically, our results suggest that participants used affect as a source of information 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1988; Slovic et al., 2002) when formulating an assessment of their own 
authenticity: I don’t feel bad, therefore I must be authentic. Thus, our findings add to the 
literature indicating that people may attribute their feelings about one target (e.g., a film, a 
piece of music) to a different target (e.g., authenticity of the self) via the “how do I feel about 
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it?” heuristic (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988). These findings should not be taken to mean, 
however, that the sense of authenticity is solely determined by the whims of daily variability 
in affect (Kuppens, Oravecz, & Tuerlinckx, 2010). In other words, individuals automatically 
experience their thoughts and feelings as emanating from the immediate situation, hence the 
infusion of incidental affect into judgments; but this does not mean that all uses of the “how 
do I feel about it?” heuristic are necessarily dysfunctional or invalid (Schwartz, 2012).  
Reliance on certain feelings may be conducive to behavioral authenticity and, as a 
result, the sense of authenticity will possess validity. For example, positive affect affords top-
down (global, heuristic) processing, which in turn facilitates playfulness, spontaneity, 
creativity, and a tendency to rely on accessible thoughts and motivations; negative affect, on 
the other hand, affords bottom-up (local, systematic) processing, which impedes the above 
outcomes (Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Schwartz, 2012). In other words, positive affect is likely 
to yield relatively automatic behavior, whereas negative affect is likely to yield relatively 
regulated, controlled behavior. Authenticity has been defined in numerous ways, but two of 
the most common tenets are: (a) acting in accord with one’s core beliefs, values, and 
motivations; and (b) showing these beliefs, values, and motivations to others (Kernis & 
Goldman, 2006; Wood et al., 2008). All else being equal then, these actions are more likely to 
follow from a situation involving positive than negative affect. Indeed, Ashton-James, 
Maddux, Galinsky, and Chartrand (2009) reported that positive affect facilitates the 
expression of personal values, whereas negative affect facilitates the expression of cultural 
(socially normative) values. 
We believe that integral affect—affect which arises from the situation itself 
(Bodenhausen, 1993)—also plays a central role in the experience of authenticity. In 
particular, it seems likely that both chronic (i.e., conditioned) and episodic (i.e., immediate) 
integral affect contribute to this experience (Bodenhausen, Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Moreno, 
2000). Our previous research (Lenton et al., 2012) demonstrates that there are common 
situations that are likely to induce authenticity and inauthenticity. For example, state 
authenticity is associated with fun, with social contact, with being in familiar surroundings, 
with having one’s psychological needs met, with high self-esteem, and with the experience of 
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discrete emotions such as contentment and relaxation. State inauthenticity, in contrast, is 
associated with failure to meet others’ or one’s own expectations, with isolation, with feeling 
judged, with discrete emotions such as anxiety, disappointment, and sadness, and with lesser 
psychological need satisfaction. Similarly, other studies have found that when people behave 
in an agreeable, extroverted, conscientious, stable, and open way, they feel more authentic 
(Fleeson & Wilt, 2010; Sheldon et al., 1997). Thus, situations that give rise to authenticity are 
also ones that give rise to positive mood (or that inhibit negative mood) and vice versa 
(Whelan & Zelenski, 2012).  
Putting it in a Wider Context 
Theoretical Implications 
The findings of Experiment 3 are the first of which we are aware to have investigated 
the theorized link between incidental affect and access to the self-system. PSI theory contends 
(Kuhl, 2000) that inducing a positive (vs. neutral or negative) mood makes the true self more 
accessible. That is, feeling good automatically brings to mind the idiosyncratic attributes 
participants associated with their true selves. Experiment 3 provided mixed evidence for this 
contention. On the one hand, the mood manipulation itself did not significantly influence 
true-self accessibility; at the same time, however, Table 2 shows a positive correlation – 
albeit a weak one – between positive affect and true-self accessibility.  
PSI theory also contends that authenticity depends on access to the self system (Koole 
& Kuhl, 2003). Ours was the second investigation into the relation between true-self (or self-
system) accessibility and the conscious, subjective experience of authenticity. Schlegel et al. 
(2009, Study 4) obtained no correlation between true-self accessibility and self-reported 
authenticity, whereas we obtained a positive correlation, at least for one measure of state 
authenticity. Thus, our findings lend some credence to the notion that implicit accessibility of 
the true self can reach awareness, such that individuals can consciously report feeling more 
authentic. The differences between the methods and materials of these two investigations may 
account for their discrepant findings. Schlegel et al. examined the accessibility-authenticity 
relation in its dispositional form (as a trait), whereas we examined it with respect to 
situational variability (as a state). Also, they assessed authenticity with a 45-item measure that 
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preceded the accessibility task, whereas we assessed authenticity with a shorter measure that 
followed the accessibility task. Future empirical efforts should seek to clarify when true-self 
accessibility enters awareness.  
The findings do not support the hypothesized moderating effect of individual 
differences in the ability to down-regulate negative affect. In Experiments 1 and 3, we 
assessed this ability using several measures and discovered that it did not alter the impact of 
incidental mood on state authenticity. According to PSI theory, those who are adept at 
maintaining positive affect and down-regulating negative affect should not succumb to the 
influence of negative affect on felt authenticity (Baumann et al., 2007; Koole & Kuhl, 2003); 
that is, they should be able to resist the attempt to induce a negative mood and, thus, not fall 
prey to the authenticity-lowering effects of this state. In our experiments, however, 
participants – no matter their standing with respect to their chronic ability to down-regulate 
negative affect – were equally likely to feel less authentic under such circumstances. 
Altogether, our findings indicate that PSI theory may benefit from further investigations of its 
hypotheses and, perhaps, refinements thereof. 
Our results have implications for previous forays into state authenticity, as they 
suggest an alternative explanation. For example in Gino et al.’s (2010) studies, knowingly 
wearing fake-brand sunglasses may have increased participants’ negative affect and this 
negative affect, rather than a sense of inauthenticity per se, may have driven their dishonest 
behavior. Evidence consistent with this suggestion indicates that negative emotions impair 
self-regulation abilities and, in so doing, increase the propensity to engage in risk-taking 
behaviors (Leith & Baumeister, 1996). As another example, in their study of the relations 
among positive and negative affect, need satisfaction, self-esteem, and felt authenticity, 
Heppner et al. (2008) described authenticity as a predictor of affect rather than the converse. 
Given the correlational nature of their methods and the findings of our experiments, it seems 
equally plausible that variability in affect contributed to variability in authenticity. More 
generally, however, we expect the relation between these constructs to be reciprocal, such 
that affect influences the sense of authenticity which, in turn, has affective consequences. 
Additional Considerations 
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Firstly, the overall effect of incidental affect on felt authenticity was between .15-.28 
(depending on the meta-analytic model), which is traditionally considered 'small' (Cohen, 
1988). That being said, one also should consider effect sizes within context (Durlak, 2009). 
For example, if affect is used heuristically to infer one's authenticity (as an “if-then” 
proposition), then one might expect the effect size to be rather sizable. Consequently, the 
small effect size would seem to contradict the heuristic account. If the use of affect as 
information is, however, depended on the nature of the situation or the judgment target (as 
many studies show that it is; e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Strack, 1999), then the 
average relationship between affect and judgment (in this case, sense of authenticity) may be 
more graded; that is, mood would be just one piece of information contributing to the 
judgment, but not the only information (and the use of mood as information will depend 
further on the individual's cognitive capacity and accuracy motivation; Forgas, 1995). From 
this point of view, it makes more sense that the effect would be significant, but small. 
We also note that both of our measures of state authenticity were explicit: They asked 
participants to reflect upon their current sense of authenticity. The measures, then, may have 
compelled participants to consider a subject that they would not have considered otherwise. 
Thus, the ecological validity of our research could be questioned. Yet, we were specifically 
interested in the conscious experience of authenticity. For example, those striving to achieve 
authenticity are likely to use the sense of (in)authenticity to assess whether they have attained 
their goal and, on the other side of the equation, the sense of (in)authenticity has real-life 
emotional and behavioral consequences for individuals (e.g., job burnout, unethical behavior; 
Gino et al., 2010; Wharton, 1999). Also, people are highly motivated to experience the sense 
of authenticity and avoid that of inauthenticity and, further, most people have experienced 
both authenticity and inauthenticity (Lenton et al., 2012). These findings demonstrate that the 
conscious experience of authenticity is relevant and important to people’s lives.  
As readers will have noted, the results were inconsistent across the two state 
authenticity measures: In Experiments 1 and 2 the manipulation (sad vs. control) reliably 
affected the RSOS, whereas in Experiment 3 the manipulation had a significant effect (happy 
vs. control) on the state version of Wood et al.'s (2008) measure and a marginally significant 
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effect on the RSOS (Experiment 2 only contained the RSOS). It is unclear why the effects 
were variable in this way, especially given the moderate correlation between the two 
measures of state authenticity (Table 1). We suspect, however, that it may have something to 
do with either the form or effectiveness of the mood manipulation (Westerman et al., 1996) 
and/or the intuitive/global versus more concrete/focused nature of the two measures (Schwarz 
& Strack, 1999).  
With respect to the former possibility, Lench, Flores, and Bench (2011) observed that 
some mood inductions (e.g., films, photographs) are more likely than others (e.g., music) to 
activate specific cognitive content. Activation of such content may be more likely to affect 
one measure than the other, depending on what that content was. Furthermore, Experiment 3 
contained the only successful manipulation of both positive and negative mood; in contrast, 
Experiments 1-2 successfully induced a sad, but not happy, mood. And of the two 
experiments using both the RSOS and adapted Wood et al. (2008) measures, in Experiment 1 
the manipulation of mood ended before participants began to fill out the dependent variable 
measures, whereas in Experiment 3 the mood manipulation actually continued (the music 
played on) while the participants completed the measures of state authenticity.  
With respect to the latter possibility, and as described previously, research suggests 
that global evaluations (such as the RSOS compels) are more likely to be infused with 
incidental affect than are domain-specific evaluations (such as the state version of the Wood 
et al. 2008 measure compels), because the former are more complex; leading people to resort 
to the use of heuristics to solve them (Schwarz & Strack). Given, however, that incidental 
affect ultimately influenced both measures across the three experiments, we believe that the 
first account (the form or effectiveness of the particular mood induction employed) is the 
more likely explanation. Still, future work might seek to distinguish the common and 
independent correlates of each measure in order to attain a more complete understanding of 
the aspects of authenticity that each measure assesses. Despite these open questions, the mini 
meta-analysis showed that, overall, where mood changed, so did the sense of authenticity. 
Coda 
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Incidental affect influences the degree to which individuals feel authentic, such that a 
relatively positive mood enhances the sense of authenticity and a relatively negative mood 
detracts from it. This finding is best explained by the heuristic use of mood as informational 
input to the judgment of one’s own authenticity.  
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Table 1 
Experiments 1-& 3: Simple Correlations between the Real-Self Overlap Scale (RSOS) and the 
Adapted Wood et al. (2008) Measure of State Authenticity.  
 
                                                      RSOS 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 3 
Overall Authenticity 
 
.54** .44** 
Authentic Living 
 
.42** .32** 
Accepting External Influence 
 
-.35** -.22** 
Self-alienation 
 
-.53** -.51** 
Note: df for correlations were 112 (Experiment 1) and 145 (Experiment 3).  
**
p < .01. 
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Table 2 
Experiment 3: Simple Correlations Among Measured Variables.  
 1 2 3 
 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 RSOS 
 
-          
2 State Auth 
 
.44** -         
           
3 State SE .30** .63** -  
 
      
4 State PubSC 
 
-.22** -.37** -.24** -       
5 State PriSC 
 
.004 -.012 .12 .26** -      
6 TS Accessibility 
 
.14 36** .32** -.16† -.04 -     
7 Mood-self 
Congruency  
 
.21* .19* .14 -.12 .04 .32** -    
8 SHS 
 
.26** .26** .39** -.21* -.02 .19* .10 -   
9 TMMS 
 
.11 .35** .30** -.16† .09 .26** .16* .52** -  
10 Reappraisal 
 
.10 .13 .21* -.18* .19* .09 -.008 .50** .37** - 
11 Suppression 
 
-.06 -.21** -.11 .15† .006 -.24** -.07 -.27** -.53** -.10 
Note. df = 145. TS = True-Self Accessibility; SHS = Subjective Happiness Scale; TMMS = Trait Meta Mood Scale. 
**
p <.01. 
*
p <.05. 
†
p < .10. 
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Table 3 
Mini Meta-Analysis Results. 
        Experiment Number 
        - Mood Manipulation 
Contrast Measure Effect size 
(Hedges’ g)
1 
SE of g p of g 
ALL CONTRASTS 
     
        1 - Video Sad vs. Control RSOS/ Wood (Combined) .388 .234 .097 
        1 - Video Happy vs. Control RSOS/ Wood (Combined) .130 .229 .570 
        2 - Facial Feedback Sad vs. Control RSOS .270 .124 .029 
        2 - Facial Feedback Happy vs. Control RSOS -.076 .124 .539 
        3 - Music Sad vs. Control RSOS/Wood (Combined) -.009 .207 .966 
        3 - Music Happy vs. Control RSOS/Wood (Combined) .449 .201 .026 
        Fixed Effect   .154 .068 .024 
        Random Effects   .169 .091 .063 
EFFECTIVE CONTRASTS 
     
        1 - Video Sad vs. Control Combined RSOS/Wood .388 .234 .097 
        2 - Facial Feedback Sad vs. Control RSOS .270 .124 .029 
        3 - Music Sad vs. Control/ Happy 
vs. Control (Combined) 
Combined RSOS/Wood .220 .204 .281 
        Fixed Effect   .279 .096 .004 
        Random Effects   .279 .096 .004 
1
 This is the sample-size-corrected form of Hedges' g. 
